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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics provides an uncertain framework for the 
enforcement of constitutional rights against the federal government.  Rather than 
recognizing a federal common law right of action for use in every case, the Court 
views itself as devising actions on a case-by-case basis in light of a range of 
factors.  Critics on all sides question the Court’s approach, doubting either its 
power to fashion federal common law or the tendency of its case-by-case analysis 
to create gaps in constitutional enforcement.  Particularly when compared with 
actions under section 1983—the statutory predicate for constitutional tort claims 
against state actors—the Bivens action has a hit or miss quality that may reflect 
lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the Court’s role. 
 This Essay argues that the Court should abandon its case-by-case approach 
in favor of routine recognition of Bivens claims.  In 1974 and more clearly in the 
Westfall Act of 1988, Congress adopted amendments to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act that assume the availability of suits against federal officers for “violations of 
the Constitution.”  Congress’s decision to ratify and preserve the Bivens action 
provides a legislative foundation for such claims that answers longstanding 
questions of legitimacy. 
After tracing the history of the Westfall Act, the Essay explores the 
doctrinal implications of the proposed switch to a routinely available Bivens 
action.  Rather than advocating a dramatic break with the past, the Essay proposes 
to harmonize cases in the Bivens line with certain doctrines that shape the 
availability of remedies under section 1983.  The resulting body of law will 
provide a more coherent Bivens framework and will ensure that constitutional 
rights apply with equal force to the interactions between individuals and officials 
at all levels of our federal government 




 I.   Introduction 
 
 Critics of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics3 have long questioned the Supreme Court’s decision to fashion a 
federal common law right of action to enforce the Fourth Amendment.4  While 
the criticism ranges broadly, a consistent theme has been to question the 
democratic and institutional legitimacy of the judicial role in fashioning remedies 
for constitutional violations.  Thus, in Bivens itself, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Black both dissented on the ground that the creation of rights of action was 
a matter for Congress.5  More recently, Justices Scalia and Thomas have 
characterized the Bivens decision as ripe for reconsideration, arguing that the 
decision was the product of an earlier time, when the Court wrongly took on the 
legislative task of recognizing new rights of action.6  Perhaps in response, the 
Court has grown a good deal more circumspect.  In its most recent decision, 
Wilkie v. Robbins,7 the Court echoed earlier cases in concluding that “special 
factors” argued against the recognition of a right of action for a novel Fifth 
Amendment retaliation claim. 8
 The Court’s willingness to analyze the existence of a Bivens action on a 
case-by-case basis introduces a layer of uncertainty into constitutional litigation.  
Rather than assuming the existence of a Bivens action for claims against federal 
 
 
                                                 
3 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
4  For a concise summary of the objection that only the legislature can or should authorize such a 
remedy, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.2 593–94 (4th ed. 2003); cf. 
Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (1985) 
(arguing that before recognizing a remedy like that in Bivens, the federal courts must “first 
determine whether Congress or the framers specifically intended to create a federal right 
enforceable by judicial action”).  A substantial body of literature defends the Bivens action as well.  
See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
289 (1995) (arguing that Bivens vindicate the principle that “[t]he Constitution is meant to 
circumscribe the power of government where it threatens to encroach on individuals”); Walter 
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.  1532 (1972) 
(finding a source for the remedy provided in Bivens in Article III’s grant of the judicial power to 
the federal courts).  For a useful summary of the Bivens case law and a primer on the academic 
literature on the subject, consult RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 812–25 (5th 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
5 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting). 
6 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2608 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Correctional 
Servs. Co. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
7 127 S. Ct. 2588. 
8 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 
(1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 




officers and agents, the federal courts must conduct a threshold inquiry to 
determine if the specific constitutional claim at issue will support an implied right 
of action.  Often, the federal courts undertake this analysis at a high level of 
particularity.9  Thus, the discharged employee of a member of Congress may 
bring a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim,10 but a dissatisfied applicant for 
government benefits may not press a Fifth Amendment due process claim.11  Fifth 
Amendment takings claims have fared slightly better,12 but retaliation aimed at 
the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to resist a government taking of 
property does not give rise to a Bivens action.13  Inmates of federal institutions 
may bring Eighth Amendment claims for cruel and unusual punishment,14 but 
individuals confined in privately run facilities have been less successful.15
Cases growing out of the Bush administration’s terrorism-related detention 
and extraordinary rendition programs highlight these concerns with the case-by-
case evaluation of the viability of novel Bivens claims.  In a series of cases 
involving individuals who were allegedly subjected to extraordinary rendition and 
to harsh and degrading conditions of confinement at Guantanamo Bay and 
elsewhere, the lower federal courts have consistently refused to recognize a 
 
 
                                                 
9 Debates over the level of particularity or generality at which to define rights pervade 
constitutional law.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (Scalia, J.) 
(arguing that courts should define liberty interests at the most specific level of abstraction); 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (foreclosing application of new rules of law to federal 
habeas petitioners and thus inviting a debate over how broadly or narrowly to define existing 
right).  In the context of Bivens litigation, courts confront a similar question in defining the 
availability of a right to sue.  Compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (allowing Bivens 
action for violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment), with Wilkie 127 
S. Ct. 2588 (foreclosing Bivens action for retaliation against individual who resisted government 
action in violation of Fifth Amendment’s taking clause)  
10 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) 
11 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) 
12 Takings claims generally give rise to suits for damages against the United States under the 
Tucker Act.  Such litigation proceeds in the United States Court of Federal Claims.  See Presault 
v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (holding that the Tucker Act is presumptively available for all 
claims arising out of a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258(1946) (“If there is a 
taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims to hear and determine [under the Tucker Act].”).  See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 
566-574 (2006) (charting the doctrinal development of claims under the Tucker Act). 
13 See Wilkie v. Robbins,127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007). 
14 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
15 See Correctional Servs. Co. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) 




Bivens remedy.16  Partly, these decisions may reflect a reluctance on the part of 
lower courts to second-guess military judgments during a time of war.  The 
decisions may also reflect uncertainty about how to apply the Court’s malleable 
standards and a presumption against the viability of any novel claim.  Apart from 
the uncertainty it engenders, the practice of judicial selectivity raises legitimacy 
issues of its own along with the very real possibility that judicial evaluation of the 
merits of the constitutional claim may influence the Bivens calculus.17
Scholars have offered a range of theories to shore up the legitimacy of the 
Bivens action.  An early article by Walter Dellinger viewed the grant of “judicial 




18  Henry Monaghan sought to include the Bivens remedy 
within the framework of what he called “constitutional common law,” law that 
grows out of permissible choices among remedial alternatives and (like other 
federal common law) remains subject to some degree of congressional control.19
                                                 
16 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (no Bivens action for alleged victim of 
extraordinary rendition program), reh’g en banc granted, (Aug. 12, 2008); In re Iraq and 
Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2007) (special factors 
counsel hesitation in recognizing a Bivens action for those allegedly subjected to cruel and 
inhumane treatment while detained overseas; alternative holding); cf. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 
644 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (detainees at Guantanamo Bay do not enjoy Fifth Amendment rights 
enforceable through a Bivens action), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (ordering 
reconsideration in light of the Court’s ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), that 
aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay enjoy constitutional right to habeas corpus).  The terrorism 
cases also raise questions about the application of the state secrets privilege, El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting Bivens claim by person allegedly subjected to 
extraordinary rendition on the ground that litigation would threaten disclosure of state secrets), and 
about the level of detail required in a pleading aimed at high government officials.  See Iqbal v. 
Ashcroft, __ U.S. __ (2009). 
17 For a suggestion that the implied right of action calculus may reflect judicial views of policy 
issues, see PETER LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR. & CURTIS BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS 14-15 (2008 
Supp.) (noting the willingness of “[c]onservative justices” to consider policy issues in deciding 
how to shape an implied private right of action)..  Given the factual detail available to the Court, 
its decision in Wilkie may have reflected judicial perceptions of the strength of the constitutional 
claim and of the burden of allowing such claims to proceed. 
  
Gene Nichol defended the Court’s exercise of remedial creativity, pointing out 
18 See Dellinger, supra note 4, at 1541-43.  For a critique, see Henry Monaghan, Foreword:  
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (noting that constitutional litigation may 
also proceed in state courts that do not themselves exercise the judicial power of the United 
States). 
19 See Monaghan, supra note 18, at 1-3.  For a critique, see Thomas S. Shrock & Robert C. Welsh, 
Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978) (contending that 
the remedy should best be viewed as constitutionally compelled and thus immune to legislative 
tinkering). 




that courts in the common law tradition have long played a role in defining the 
remedies needed to vindicate important rights.20  Richard Fallon and Daniel 
Meltzer would incorporate the Bivens remedy into a remedial framework that 
seeks to ensure that government actors generally operate within the bounds of the 
law.21
In this Essay, we offer a new account of the legitimacy of the Bivens right 
of action.  In our view, scholars and courts have paid too much attention to the 
state of the law in 1971, when Bivens came down, and too little to legislative 
developments that have occurred in its wake.  Congress has taken steps to 
preserve and ratify the Bivens remedy with amendments to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act that took effect in 1974 and 1988.  In 1974, responding to concerns 
with the adequacy of a Bivens remedy, Congress expanded the right of individuals 
to sue the government itself for certain law enforcement torts.  At the time, 
Congress deliberately chose to retain the right of individuals to sue government 
officers for constitutional torts and rejected draft legislation from the Department 
of Justice that would have substituted the government as a defendant on such 
claims.  Similarly, in the Westfall Act of 1988, Congress took further steps to 
solidify the Bivens remedy.  The Westfall Act virtually immunizes federal 
government officials from state common law tort liability, substituting the 
government as a defendant under the FTCA for such claims.
  Notably, the Fallon and Meltzer approach places greater emphasis on 
systemic issues than on the right of any particular individual to secure a remedy.  
Thus, a Bivens remedy operates as a fallback device and its availability 
necessarily depends in part, as it did in Wilkie, on a case-by-case evaluation of the 
array of available alternative remedies.  Despite these efforts at justifying, 
narrowing, and defending the Bivens remedy, critics remain dubious. 
 
22
                                                 
20 Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damage Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 
(1989). 
21 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). 
  In the course of 
22 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-694, 102 
Stat. 4564 [hereinafter Westfall Act].  Under the Westfall Act, individuals may pursue common 
law tort claims against federal government officials in state court.  If the Attorney General finds 
that the defendant government officer acted in the course and scope of his employment, 
certification of that fact leads the substitution of the federal government as a defendant and 
removal of the action to federal court.  Under this scheme, government officials may be sued for 
state common law torts only for actions taken outside their official capacity.  Such claims do not 
typically involve government action and do not present constitutional issues.  For a summary of 
the Westfall certification process, see Part III.  Courts have struggled to define when employees 
acting willfully and in violation of state law nonetheless act under color of state law for purposes 
of triggering the application of section 1983.  See Doe v. Taylor Indep. School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 




doing so, it declares that the remedy provided against the federal government 
shall be deemed “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money 
damages . . . against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
action.”23  In order to preserve the Bivens action, Congress declared the 
exclusivity rule inapplicable to suits brought against government officials “for a 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”24
Although the Supreme Court has apparently never considered the issue, 
we think the Westfall Act should be interpreted to provide for the routine 
availability of Bivens claims.  Both the language of the Act, with its express 
preservation of claims for constitutional violations, and its structure support this 
conclusion.  The structural confirmation flows from the fact that Congress, by 
transforming claims for law enforcement (and other) torts into claims against the 
United States under the FTCA,
   
 
25 has largely eliminated state common law 
remedies as a relevant source of relief for individuals who have suffered a 
constitutional injury.  It is no longer possible, as it was in Bivens’ day, to proceed 
to judgment against federal officers on the basis of the common law.26  Moreover, 
Congress has declined to make a remedy for constitutional violations available 
against the federal government under the FTCA, a decision that (under the 
prevailing law of federal sovereign immunity) forecloses that remedial option.27
                                                                                                                                     
461-62 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that high school teacher acted under color of state law in using 
his position to molest a student in his class). 
23 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1) (2006). 
24 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2) (2006).   
25 The mechanics of the substitution by the federal government as the defendant are explained in 
Part III. 
26 Although no brief summary can capture the complexity of accountability rules in the nineteenth 
century, individuals could bring a variety of actions (injunction, mandamus, trespass, assumpsit, 
ejectment) to test the legality of government action.  See, e.g., Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
331 (1806) (damages for wrongful seizure of property to enforce illegal fine); Meigs v. McClung’s 
Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815) (ejectment); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738 (1824) (injunction against trespassory taxation); Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 
Pet.) 137 (1836) (assumpsit to recover customs tax from the collector).  Often, as in Osborn, 
officials would justify by reference to statutory authority, thus posing the question of the 
constitutionality of their action or its statutory justification.  See Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 
92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) (declaring in such a case of justification that an “unconstitutional law will 
be treated by the courts as null and void.”); cf. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 
(1891) (Holmes, J.) (in trespass action for compensation for destruction of property, due process 
entitlement to compensation framed court’s analysis of agency’s statutory defense).  See generally 
Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 
(1987). 
  
27 See Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein & Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional 
Torts Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497, 510-16 (1976) (discussing the 




As a result, it makes little sense to assume (as the dissenting Justices did in Bivens 
and as others have done in later cases) that the denial of a Bivens remedy will 
leave individuals fully able to pursue claims on a state law theory of liability.  
Today, Bivens provides the only generally available basis on which individuals 
can seek an award of damages for federal violations of constitutional rights.  In 
1971, it was “damages or nothing” for Webster Bivens, as Justice Harlan vividly 
explained;28
Recognition that the Bivens remedy enjoys a much firmer federal statutory 
foundation than conventionally understood will require some rethinking of the 
way constitutional litigation proceeds.  If, as our analysis suggests, Congress has 
ratified the pursuit of Bivens claims, courts need no longer agonize at the 
threshold about whether to recognize the existence of such an action.  We suggest 
instead that federal courts should treat the Bivens action, much like its counterpart 
under section 1983, as routinely available.  Such an approach would build on the 
Court’s sensible decision to treat the Bivens action and the section 1983 claims as 
parallel proceedings that warrant similar treatment.  As the Court explained long 
ago, it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law 
between suits brought against state officials . . . and suits brought directly under 
the Constitution against federal officials.”
 today, it has become Bivens or nothing for those who seek to 
vindicate constitutional rights. 
 
29
By presuming the availability of a Bivens action, our proposed 
reconceptualization provides a more satisfying explanation of the Court’s cases 
and a more coherent account of the shape of constitutional tort doctrine.  Many 
   With the right to bring a Bivens 
action routinely available, the federal courts no longer need to see themselves as 
fashioning a right of action to vindicate a novel constitutional claim; rather, the 
litigation would focus as it does under section 1983 on whether the complaint 
states a claim for violation of the Constitution that overcomes the officers’ 
qualified immunity defense.  Such a course of action would answer critics of the 
judicial role and end the case-by-case process by which the federal courts now 
evaluate the availability of a Bivens action. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
consideration and rejection of proposed legislation by the Justice Department that would have 
created liability for constitutional violations against the federal government).  The Supreme Court 
has held that constitutional tort actions cannot lie against the federal government.  FDIC v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994) (rejecting Bivens claim directly against federal agency); see also 
cases cited infra note 84. 
28 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
29 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). 




scholars have puzzled over the Court’s willingness in cases such as Bush v. 
Lucas30 and Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko31 to treat the availability of 
alternative remedies as fatal to the individual’s right to pursue a Bivens claim.32  
Those decisions may make more sense when viewed through the lens of section 
1983.  In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,33 the Court provided a 
framework for evaluating when alternative statutory remedies displace the section 
1983 remedy for constitutional tort claims.  One might sensibly apply this 
framework in assessing the Court’s decision in Bush v. Lucas, where civil service 
remedies for a whistleblower’s constitutional claims served to displace a Bivens 
remedy. Similarly, in Parratt v. Taylor,34
Our Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part II sketches the Court’s current 
approach to the recognition of a Bivens right of action, focusing on the 
comparatively recent decision in Wilkie v. Robbins and the questions of 
legitimacy it raises.  Part III sets forth the case for viewing the Westfall Act as 
providing an all-purpose statutory predicate for suits for “a violation of the 
Constitution.”  Such an interpretation not only would give effect to the language 
of the statute, but would bring the treatment of suits against federal officers into 
line with that of actions against state and local officials under section 1983.  Part 
IV works out the implications of the Westfall Act’s recognition of an all-purpose 
right to sue.  Under our suggested approach, the existence of alternative remedies 
would continue to play a role in the evaluation of the right to sue, as would 
consideration of a range of limiting factors that now inform the existence of relief 
under section 1983.  We conclude with a review of cases in the Bivens line, 
showing how our approach would re-shape current doctrine.   In the end, we 
believe that Bivens and section 1983 doctrine would both gain from the 
development of the parallel approach we advocate here.  Rather than 
 the Court held that the existence of 
post-deprivation remedies may, in certain circumstances, obviate procedural due 
process claims that section 1983 would otherwise remedy.  Cases in the Parratt 
line may help to explain Malesko, which featured allegations of negligence that 
would apparently fail to support a claim of actionable deprivation.  By drawing on 
the section 1983 framework for the analysis of remedial alternatives, the Court 
would avoid the ad hoc reliance on “special factors” that has characterized its 
recent Bivens decisions. 
 
                                                 
30 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
31 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
32 See, e.g. Bandes, supra note 4; Laurence Tribe, Death By a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional 
Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23. 
33 129 S.Ct. 788 (2009). 
34 4 51 U.S. 527 (1981) 




administering separate bodies of law for state and federal officers, the federal 
courts would offer similar redress for alleged violations of the Constitution at all 
levels of government. 
 
II. Bivens and the Quest for Legitimacy 
 
Questions about the legitimacy of Bivens date from the decision’s 
announcement in 1971 and have persisted over the years.  In Bivens, the Court 
recognized a federal right of action to enforce the Fourth Amendment.35  The 
plaintiff, Webster Bivens, alleged that agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
entered his home without a warrant and conducted a search of the premises that 
violated his constitutional rights.36  Although he might have brought suit in state 
court, seeking damages for a common law trespass, Bivens chose to file his suit in 
federal court, seeking damages directly under the Constitution.37  In upholding his 
right to sue, the Court effectively held that federal law enables individuals to sue 
federal officers for constitutional violations.38
The absence of federal statutory support for the right to sue provided one 
important focus of the dissent’s criticism of the Bivens decision.  Chief Justice 
Burger, along with Justices Black and Blackmun, argued that Congress should 
take the lead in defining the way individuals enforce the Constitution.
  Bivens thus provides a federal law 
analog to the right of individuals to bring constitutional tort claims against state 
and local government officials.  But in contrast to suits against state actors, which 
Congress specifically authorized in section 1983, no federal statute authorized 
individuals in the position of Webster Bivens to sue federal officials.   
 
39  Perhaps 
the most interesting response to the dissent was that provided by the concurring 
opinion of Justice Harlan.  Harlan argued that a federal right of action already 
existed; that individuals in Bivens’ position could have sued in federal court for 
injunctive relief against a pending or threatened Fourth Amendment violation.40
                                                 
35 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 389–90. 
38 See id. at 394–96. 
39 See id. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“We would more surely preserve the important 
values of the doctrine of separation of powers-and perhaps get a better result-by recommending a 
solution to the Congress as the branch of government in which the Constitution has vested the 
legislative power.”); id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 404–05 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
  
All the Court was really adding was a federal remedy in the nature of tort 




damages for folks like Bivens who lacked any effective alternative.41  Moreover, 
Harlan pointed to the fact that the Court had previously allowed individuals to 
bring federal claims to enforce rights conferred by statute, even though the statute 
at issue had failed to provide that the rights in question were enforceable by 
individual suit.42
Since Bivens, the Court has withdrawn in two respects from the ground it 
occupied there.  First, as noted above, the Court now takes a case-by-case 
approach to the evaluation of the availability of a Bivens action for particular 
constitutional claims.  In deciding whether to “devise” a right of action, the Court 
considers the array of alternative remedies and the implications, if any, of the 
action Congress has taken (or failed to take) in furnishing an action for damages.  
Coupled with this greater selectivity, the Court has essentially abandoned the 
practice of recognizing implied rights of action to enforce statutory claims.  The 
Court recently described its decision in J.I. Case as following a discredited 
approach, and reaffirmed its reluctance to recognize an individual right to sue 
except where “the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose an intent to 
create” a right of action.
  If the Court could legitimately expand the range of remedies for 
statutory violations, Harlan suggested, the Court might well recognize a judge-
made remedy for constitutional violations. 
 
43
The critique of Bivens rests at bottom on claims about the proper roles of 
the federal courts and Congress in the recognition of rights to sue.  As Justice 
Powell observed in his dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
Congress normally takes the lead in deciding who can sue to enforce rights in 
federal courts.
  This change deprives the Bivens doctrine of one 
supporting prop and fuels the argument by Justices Scalia and Thomas that Bivens 




                                                 
41 Id. at 410 (“It will be a rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be able to 
obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any court. However desirable a direct remedy 
against the Government might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still 
remains immune to suit. Finally, assuming Bivens' innocence of the crime charged, the 
‘exclusionary rule’ is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.”). 
42 Id. at 402 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
43 See Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008); 
see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001). 
44 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
  As Justice Kennedy observed more recently, echoing Justice 
Powell, judicial willingness to recognize implied rights of action may interfere 
with the legislative process by adding new provisions to a statute that Congress 




had not seen fit to insert.45  More fundamentally, the Court understands that the 
recognition of a federal right to sue—given current jurisdictional arrangements—
inevitably results in the expansion of access to the federal courts for individual 
suitors.  The Court’s more recent decisions suggest that Congress should make the 
decision about expanded access, rather than the federal courts.46
 The Court’s own approach in recent cases does little to answer critics of 
the judicial role.  In Wilkie v. Robbins, the record tended to show that officials of 
the Bureau of Land Management had retaliated against Robbins for refusing to 
grant the Bureau a right-of-way across his land.
  One can, of 
course, question the validity of these criticisms on their own terms and their 
application to the different situation in Bivens, where constitutional (rather than 
statutory) rights were at stake.  But questions of institutional competence lie at the 
heart of the call to overrule Bivens. 
 
47  Robbins claimed that he had a 
right, protected by the Fifth Amendment, to exclude the federal government from 
his land.  He further argued that BLM officials’ retaliation for the exercise of that 
right to exclude gave rise to an action for damages under Bivens.  The Court set 
for itself the task of deciding whether to “devise a new Bivens damages action” 
for retaliation against landowner rights.48  In deciding whether to take this 
affirmative step, the Court first evaluated the range of alternative remedies 
available to Robbins and next considered the propriety of extending constitutional 
litigation into borderline cases where citizens and government officials 
predictably clash in negotiations over rights in land.49
                                                 
45 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771-73. 
46 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (focusing on congressional intent and 
legislative history in denying an implied right of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act). 
47 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593-96 (2007). 
48 Id. at 2597. 
49 The Court suggested that the analysis breaks down into two steps, focusing first on the 
availability of any “alternative, existing process” to vindicate the interest at stake.  Id. at 2598.  
Even at the second stage of the process, in the absence of an alternative, the Court cautioned that a 
Bivens remedy “is a subject of judgment.”  The judgment at hand requires that the federal courts  
“make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying 
particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new 
kind of federal litigation.” Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).  Ultimately, the 
Court found that the patchwork array of alternative remedies was not decisive of the availability of 
a Bivens action and proceeded to the second stage of the analysis, the common law remedial 
determination. 
  With its first-step focus on 
alternative remedies, the Court assumed (perhaps mistakenly) that trespass 




remedies were available as a matter of state tort law.50  In its second-step analysis, 
which the Court likened to the remedial judgment of a common-law tribunal, the 
Court expressed reluctance to burden federal officers with a new category of 
constitutional litigation, thus sounding themes reminiscent of those given voice by 
the Bivens dissenters.51
 The Court’s suggestion that each extension of Bivens requires an act of 
judicial creativity based upon the exercise of common-law, case-by-case analysis 
tends to obscure the precise import of its decision.  One might read the decision as 
a blanket prohibition against landowner retaliation claims under the Fifth 
Amendment.  After all, the Court decided the case on the assumption that it was 
one of first impression; the parties had looked in vain for other reported cases in 
which the plaintiff sought damages after the government attempted to secure 
property rights coercively.
  In the end, the Court declined to allow a Bivens action, 
and held that the matter was one for Congress to consider. 
 
52  On the other hand, the Court stayed very close to the 
factual record in the case, emphasizing that BLM officials had a legitimate 
interest in obtaining a right-of-way across Robbins’ land and had successfully 
defended many of the adverse actions they had taken against Robbins.  It was the 
perceived difficulty of drawing lines between the government’s legitimate right to 
engage in hard bargaining and the claim that it had gone too far in pursuing the 
right-of-way that informed the Court’s decision.  The Court thus distinguished 
Robbins’ retaliation claim, death by a thousand cuts, from actionable retaliation 
claims that grow out of one or more discrete government actions.53
                                                 
50 Id.  The Court cited Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001), for the 
proposition that common law remedies were presumptively available, but that case involved a suit 
against a private firm, working under contract with the federal government.  Suits cannot go 
forward against federal officers as a matter of state common law; under the Westfall Act, as we 
discuss at greater length in Part III below, federal officials enjoy an absolute immunity from state 
common law tort liability.  Rather, litigants must pursue tort claims against the federal government 
under the FTCA.  Similarly puzzling is the Court’s suggestion that Robbins might have pursued a 
malicious prosecution claim under state law.  See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2599 (noting the possibility 
that malicious prosecution claim would be “unavailable against federal officials”; citing Blake v. 
Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1007 (Wyo. 1982) for the proposition that such claims will not lie against 
law enforcement officers).  This comment mistakenly assumes the viability of state law claims 
against federal officials and apparently overlooks the fact that the Court had previously made 
Bivens relief available for cases of malicious prosecution.  See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 
(2006). 
51 See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2601-05. 
52 See id. at 2615-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the parties’ agreement as to the absence of 
reported cases involving allegations of coercive action by state officials to secure a property right 
in violation of the Takings Clause). 
53 See id. at 2600-04 (majority opinion). 
 





 Its focus on the particulars of what the Court described as a factually 
plentiful record opens the door to the criticisms of arbitrariness that inevitably 
accompany any fact-specific analysis.  Similar criticisms follow from the Wilkie 
Court’s decision to single out the Fifth Amendment retaliation claim for 
rejection.54  Only a year earlier, in Hartman v. Moore,55 the Court had confirmed 
that First Amendment retaliatory or malicious prosecution claims were viable 
under Bivens, as long as the plaintiff pleads and proves a lack of probable cause 
for the prosecution.56  In upholding the viability of such retaliation claims, the 
Hartman Court reaffirmed a line of cases that stretches back some twenty years 
and includes such venerable decisions as Butz v. Economou and Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald.57  All of these cases present a variation on the same theme:  an 
individual claims that government officials have taken superficially legitimate 
action for the improper purpose of punishing him for exercising his constitutional 
rights.  All of these cases inevitably present line-drawing problems as well.58
                                                 
54 Indeed, one has difficulty escaping the conclusion that the plaintiff in Wilkie could have 
successfully pursued a Bivens action had he framed his claims either as a malicious prosecution 
claim, as approved in Hartman, or a retaliation claim based on the exercise of rights under the 
First Amendment. 
55 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 
56 As the Court explained in an opinion by Justice Souter, “[w]hen the vengeful officer is federal, 
he is subject to an action for damages on the authority of Bivens.”  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 
250, 256 (2006). 
57 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (allegations that government initiated enforcement 
proceeding to retaliate against critic of the agency); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) 
(allegations that high government officials discharged the plaintiff from government employment 
to punish the plaintiff for speaking out against a wasteful federal project); cf. Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589, 592 (1998) (treating the right to pursue retaliation claims as a general 
rule that has long been clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity and characterizing 
Harlow as a case in which the plaintiff would have prevailed but for the availability of the 
immunity doctrine).  See generally Mark Brown, The Failure of Fault Under Section 1983:  
Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503 (1999) (evaluating the 
state of qualified immunity law after Crawford-El); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 
1983 Cases:  The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597 (1989) (interrogating the qualified 
immunity regime of Harlow v. Fitzgerald). 
58 As the Hartman Court explained, some actions “might well be unexceptionable if taken on other 
grounds, but when nonretaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse 
consequences, we have held that retaliation is subject to recovery as the but-for cause of official 
action offending the Constitution.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256.  Had it taken such an approach, the 
Court might have permitted Robbins to argue that the range of government actions could not be 
explained on nonretaliatory grounds.   
  
Thus, in Hartman, the trier of fact would have had to decide if the defendant 
postal inspectors launched a criminal investigation to punish the plaintiff for 




lobbying against a new feature of the zip code program or to vindicate genuine 
concerns with the legality of his lobbying activities.  The line-drawing problems 
identified in Wilkie do not seem either particularly difficult or different in kind 
from those faced in other retaliation litigation.59
 The selectivity entailed in the Court’s case-by-case approach invites 
attacks from critics on both sides.  Those who question the judicial role in Bivens 
can point to recent cases in support of their claim that the Court has yet to 
articulate a justification for taking on the essentially legislative task of deciding 
when to fashion a damages action.  For these critics, as for the concurring Justices 




60  Those who continue to view Bivens as rightly decided can 
mount a similar criticism of the Court’s failure to make the action available to all 
suitors who allege serious violations of their constitutional rights.61
III. Congress and the Ratification of the Bivens Remedy 
  For these 
critics, as for the dissent in Wilkie, the Court’s refusal to allow claims for 
retaliation under the Fifth Amendment cannot be squared with its willingness to 
permit First Amendment retaliation claims to proceed. 
 
 
We believe the Court’s case-by-case evaluation of the Bivens remedy rests 
on an outmoded understanding of the statutory framework of federal government 
accountability.  That framework now includes, most importantly, the revised 
terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which authorizes individuals to sue the 
federal government for claims sounding in tort and which specifically preserves 
and ratifies the Bivens remedy.  Preservation and ratification of the Bivens remedy 
began in 1974, when Congress amended the FTCA to expand the right of 
                                                 
59 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2613-15 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (likening 
Robbins’s claim to recognized causes of action for retaliation against the exercise of constitutional 
rights).  The majority argued that the inquiry in the Robbins case was complicated by the 
obligation to separate acceptable hard bargaining from tactics that went too far   The Court 
reasoned that a standard looking for “too much” of an impermissible motive would not be 
workable.  See id. at  2601-04 (majority opinion).  Yet as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent observed, the 
assessment that a “too much” standard would prove unworkable glosses over the fact that 
standards of this sort are employed elsewhere, such as in the Title VII sexual harassment context 
where the mere existence of offensive statements do not create a violation.  Instead, courts must 
determine that the harassment is so pervasive as to create a hostile environment.  Such a standard 
might well be workable for plaintiffs like Robbins.  See id. at 2616-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
60 See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (arguing that Bivens 
should not be extended under any circumstances and should be confined to its facts). 
61 See generally Tribe, supra note 32.  




individuals to sue the government for certain law enforcement torts.62  In doing 
so, Congress deliberately retained the right of individuals to sue government 
officers for constitutional torts and rejected proposed legislation from the 
Department of Justice that would have substituted the government as a defendant 
on such claims.63  Similarly, in 1988, Congress took steps virtually to immunize 
federal government officials from state common law tort liability, substituting the 
government as a defendant under the FTCA for such claims.64  At the same time, 
Congress fashioned an exception to the statutory grant of official immunity, 
expressly preserving the right of individuals to pursue Bivens actions for “a 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”65
                                                 
62 See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) 




 This statutory framework provides important and overlooked legislative 
support for the right of individuals to pursue claims against government officers 
for a violation of the Constitution.  While the language does not follow section 
1983 in expressly creating a right to sue federal government officials, the statute 
clearly recognizes and preserves the right to sue that the Court had established in 
Bivens and elaborated in subsequent cases.  By speaking in broad and unqualified 
terms, moreover, the statute suggests that any alleged violation of the Constitution 
will support a claim against federal officials.  In other words, the statute does not 
contemplate the use of the kind of case-by-case analysis that characterized the 
Court’s approach in Wilkie v. Robbins but takes the view that actions are 
presumptively available so long as the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation.  
We do not mean to suggest that a simple claim of constitutional breach will 
enable the plaintiff to reach a jury; the plaintiff must still allege an actionable 
constitutional violation and overcome any qualified immunity defense.  But we do 
mean to argue that Congress has now ratified the Bivens remedy, providing 
statutory recognition of such claims that largely answers the old legitimacy 
problem.  The Court need no longer act as a common-law tribunal in “devising” a 
new remedy without any guidance from Congress.  Instead, the Court can simply 
point to the statute as evidence that Congress has approved and preserved the 
availability of a Bivens action. 
 
63 See S. 2558, 93d Cong. (1973) (authorizing a cause of action against the federal government for 
intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers, including actions arising “under the 
Constitution or statutes of the United States”); see also Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 
27, at 500-02 (describing the DOJ proposal and its subsequent rejection). 
64 Westfall Act § 6. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) (2006)). 
65 Id. § 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2006)). 




 The case for recognizing that Congress has established a presumptive 
remedy in the nature of a Bivens action draws support both from the language of 
the statute and from the considerations that led to its adoption.  In 1974, Congress 
was concerned about a series of federal no-knock drug enforcement raids on 
private homes in and around St. Louis, Missouri.66  Although it recognized that 
the victims could pursue a Bivens action, Congress was concerned that such 
actions against government officials might not adequately compensate injured 
victims and deter government wrongdoing.  Accordingly, Congress added the 
federal government as a defendant by making suits available under the FTCA for 
a series of law-enforcement torts.  These new remedies under the FTCA were 
designed to supplement, not displace, the Bivens action.67  Congress rejected 
statutory language, proposed by the Department of Justice, that would have 
eliminated the Bivens action altogether in favor of suits against the government 
for constitutional violations.  In so doing, members of Congress made clear that 
the Bivens action was to survive the expansion of government liability for law 
enforcement torts.  The federal courts quickly confirmed this conclusion.68
                                                 
66 See Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization, 
Research, and Internal Organizations of the Senate Comm. On Government Operations, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 446 (hearings regarding raids in Collinsville, Illinois, including 
testimonies from families subject to raids); 119 CONG. REC. 23242–58 (1973) (expressing concern 
over the raids); 119 CONG. REC. 15170 (same).  A more detailed history of the raids and reaction 
is provided in Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 
 
 
27, at 500–07. 
67 S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973) (“[T]his provision should be viewed as counterpart to the Bivens 
case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the 
government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have 
occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual government 
officials involved.”). 
68 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 & n.5 (“[T]he congressional comments 
accompanying [the FTCA] amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and 
Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action . . . .  In the absence of a contrary expression 
from Congress, § 2680(h) thus contemplates that victims . . . shall have an action under FTCA 
against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual officers . . . .”) (citations 
omitted); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing suits 
under the FTCA from constitutional torts).  For a time, at least one federal court of appeals 
misread the amendment to permit Bivens actions against the federal government itself.  See Norton 
v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978) (concluding that the FTCA amendments authorized 
Bivens suits against the United States).  This conclusion can no longer be supported in light of 
Carlson’s interpretation of the amendment, and the Fourth Circuit has subsequently incorporated 
Carlson’s understanding of the relationship between the FTCA and Bivens.  See Holly v. Scott, 
434 F. 3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the relationship between the FTCA and Bivens as 
explained in Carlson). 




 Congress took a second step in 1988.  Acting to protect government 
officials from state common-law tort liability,69 Congress adopted the Westfall 
Act.  In doing so, Congress chose to substitute the federal government as a 
defendant for any federal officers who were sued on state common law tort 
theories of liability for actions taken within the outer perimeter of their official 
capacity.  The Act accomplishes this substitution by empowering the Attorney 
General to certify that the allegedly tortious conduct occurred within the officer’s 
line of duty.70  Upon certification, the government substitutes in as the defendant 
and can remove the action from state to federal court.71  Thereafter, the action 
proceeds against the federal government under the FTCA.72  In such actions, the 
FTCA incorporates state common law as the foundation of the federal 
government’s liability, and refers to the law of the place where the tort occurred 
in defining such liability.73  But the FTCA does not rely on state common law as 
the final measure of the government’s liability.  A well-known collection of 
federal law defenses protect the government’s interests.  For example, the FTCA 
bars liability for the exercise of discretionary functions,74 requires a notice of the 
claim,75 imposes a fairly short statute of limitations,76 and incorporates the 
official’s own federal immunity from liability.77
 By foreclosing suit against federal officers on state law theories of liability 
and shifting to remedies against the government under the FTCA, the Westfall 
Act assumes the routine availability of a Bivens remedy.  That conclusion seems 
clear both from the language of the Act, which broadly preserves the availability 
 
 
                                                 
69 See Westfall Act § 2(a)(4), 2(b) (explaining findings and purposes of the Act, which was named 
after the government official whose claim of immunity was rejected in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 
292 (1988)). 
70 Id. § 6 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2006)). 
71 See id. § 6; Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (treating the Attorney General’s certification 
as conclusive for purposes of removal jurisdiction).  But see Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 
515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995) (Attorney General’s scope-of-employment certifications subject to 
judicial review). 
72 Westfall Act § 6. 
73 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
74 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
75 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006) (requiring notice and disposition of a claim by the appropriate 
federal agency prior to filing FTCA suit); see Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health 
Center, 403 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (FTCA exhaustion requirement applies to claims commenced 
against federal officers in state court and removed to federal court under the Westfall Act). 
76 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006) (requiring notice of possible tort claims to federal agency within 
two years). 
77 Westfall Act § 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006)). 




of a Bivens action for violations of the Constitution,78 and from the Act’s 
structural implications.  Under the Westfall Act, state common law no longer 
applies by its own force to the actions of federal officials.79  As a result, plaintiffs 
can no longer invoke state law to contest the constitutionality of the conduct of 
federal officers.  This represents a significant change from the remedial 
framework in place at the time of the Bivens decision.  Back then and for much of 
the nation’s history, state common law provided victims with a right of action 
that, although somewhat cumbersome, could eventually result in a vindication of 
their constitutional rights.  For example, the victim of an unlawful search might 
sue the responsible federal official for a trespass.  The official could respond by 
trying to show that the search was authorized by federal law.  In reply, the 
plaintiff could argue that the official’s violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against unreasonable searches invalidated any authority conferred by federal law.  
In the end, the common law claim would eventually lead to an evaluation of the 
extent of federal authority in light of constitutional limitations and to an award of 
damages to victims of government wrongdoing.80
Today, this background system of state common law remedies for the 
violation of constitutional rights has been superseded by the Westfall Act.  With 
the elimination of state common law, Congress faced the question of how to 
provide for the assertion of federal constitutional claims.  One possibility was to 
have made an explicit provision for the assertion of constitutional claims against 
the government itself.  As we have seen, the Department of Justice proposed that 





                                                 
78 Westfall Act § 5 (creating an exception to the exclusivity provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) for 
actions “brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States”). 
  In the Westfall Act, Congress again chose to retain the Bivens 
79 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
80 Although the Court established an absolute immunity for federal officers sued for defamatory 
statements made in the course of their official duties, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); 
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), this immunity did not impose a similarly absolute bar to 
other kinds of common law liability.  See supra note 26; see also Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 282 
(1988) (no immunity from suit at common law unless the conduct was both within the scope of 
official duty and discretionary).  Some suits based on theories of trespass and false imprisonment 
as well as those growing out of a taking of private property went forward even though one could 
argue that they resulted from discretionary acts.  See Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891) 
(Holmes, J.).  See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 249-
50 (1965).  Claims for improper exaction of customs duties were also permitted to proceed 
without any discussion of official immunity.  See Irving v. Wilson, 4 Term R. 485, 100 Eng. Rep. 
1132 (K.B. 1791); Elliot v. Swartwout, U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836). 
81 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 




action when faced with such a proposal.82  Not only does the statute specifically 
recognize suits for constitutional violations against government officials, the 
FTCA contains no provision authorizing the assertion of constitutional claims 
against the federal government.  Under the prevailing approach to the doctrine of 
federal sovereign immunity, the absence of a clear statement authorizing suits 
against the government has proven fatal to their assertion. 83  A long line of cases 
holds that constitutional claims for damages may not be brought against the 
federal government itself, but may proceed only against government officials on a 
Bivens theory. 84  The only exception, established in the Tucker Act, authorizes 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to hear Fifth Amendment takings claims against 
the federal government.85
By approving of Bivens and making it the exclusive mode for vindicating 
constitutional rights, Congress has provided a solid legislative foundation for 
routine recognition of a Bivens remedy.  Such congressional ratification, 
moreover, requires that the Court adjust its approach to the evaluation of 
constitutional claims for damages.  The Court should no longer regard itself as 
creating rights of action on a case-by-case basis.  Rather, the Court should simply 
recognize that Congress has authorized suits against federal officials for 
constitutional violations and has foreclosed all alternative remedies.  Along with 
this recognition, the Court should no longer consider the possible existence of 
  For constitutional tort claims, the Westfall Act makes 
clear that Bivens provides the only right of action. 
 
                                                 
82 Once again, the DoJ proposed funneling all liability, including that for constitutional torts, into 
suits brought against the federal government.  Congress again self-consciously chose to retain the 
Bivens action.  See H.R. REP. 100-700, at 5 (1988) (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bivens, the courts have identified this type of tort as a more serious intrusion of the right of an 
individual that merits special attention.  Consequently, H.R. 4612 would not affect the ability of 
victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress from Federal employees who allegedly 
violate their Constitutional rights.”); 134 CONG. REC. 15963 (June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Frank) (“We make special provisions here to make clear that the  more controversial issue of 
constitutional torts is not covered by this bill.  If you are accused of having violated someone’s 
constitutional rights, this bill does not affect it.  You might be individually sued.”). 
83 See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 
30, 33 (1992) (“Waivers of the Government's sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be 
unequivocally expressed.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
84 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994) (rejecting Bivens claim directly against 
federal agency); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(same); Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting on sovereign immunity 
grounds a First Amendment Bivens claim against the United States); Arnsberg v. United States, 
757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1985) (same with respect to Fourth Amendment claim); United States 
v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (same with respect to Fifth Amendment claim). 
85 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 




state common law remedies as a reason to proceed cautiously.  Congress has 
eliminated the state common law option and has failed to replace it with suits 
under the FTCA to vindicate constitutional rights.  It thus makes little sense for 
the Court in Wilkie v. Robbins to tout the possible existence of state common law 
remedies as the basis for proceeding cautiously in the recognition of a Bivens 
right of action.86
One can imagine an argument that the Westfall Act’s reference to actions 
for violation of the Constitution operates not to approve an all-purpose Bivens 
action but to codify the case-by-case Bivens calculus that was in place in 1988 
when the statute took effect.  The text of the Westfall Act provides little basis for 
such a contention.  The statute refers to a “civil action” “brought” against federal 
officers asserting a claim for “violation of the Constitution.”
  State common law, as such, no longer applies and no longer 
offers a way to present constitutional claims. 
 
87
Finally, one can imagine a formal argument that the statute does nothing 
more than create an exception to the rule of immunity that the Westfall Act 
adopted to shield federal employees from common law claims.  On such a view, 
the Act creates no affirmative right to sue, but simply prevents the statutory rule 
of immunity from displacing the Bivens action.  As we have seen, however, the 
Westfall Act goes well beyond conferring a selective grant of immunity on federal 
officers; it forecloses pursuit of constitutional claims either by action predicated 
on state common law or by action against the government itself.  Read against the 
backdrop of the wholesale withdrawal of alternative remedies, the saving 
reference operates less as a modest exception to immunity than as a congressional 
selection of the Bivens action as the only method individuals were authorized to 
use in pressing constitutional claims.
  The unqualified 
references in the statute seemingly authorize the pursuit of all “civil actions[]” 
that assert constitutional claims, without suggesting that the federal courts may 
refrain from hearing certain claims.  We explain below why Congress may have 
chosen to switch from the case-by-case approach to a more routinely available 
right of action. 
 
88
                                                 
86 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007) (citing Correctional Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001), for the proposition that state law tort remedies could serve as 
a possible alternative for the plaintiff’s claims).  One can see the Wilkie Court’s confusion 
reflected in its citation to the Malesko case.  There, state tort liability remained intact because the 
defendant was a private firm, rather than a federal government actor entitled to Westfall Act 
immunity. 
87 Westfall Act § 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006)). 
 
88 Congress took modest steps to curtail Bivens actions by federal prisoners when it adopted the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  But 





The withdrawal of alternative remedies explains why Congress made the 
Bivens action routinely available, rather than dependent on case-by-case analysis.  
In pre-Westfall days, individual litigants had a right to sue federal officers for 
constitutional torts by relying on common-law theories of liability and filing suit 
in state court.  Such suits were subject to removal and to the assertion of 
immunity defenses of varying stringency, but the right of action was available as a 
matter of course (assuming the plaintiff could identify a common law theory of 
liability).89
IV. Rethinking Bivens:  Toward a New Remedial Calculus 
  Having cut off that routinely available remedy in the Westfall Act, 
Congress understandably felt some obligation to provide a statutory alternative.  
The unqualified terms of the resulting ratification of Bivens suggest that the 
Westfall Act contemplates rights of action as a matter of course. 
 
 
Recognition of the routine availability of a Bivens action will require some 
changes in the way the federal courts approach constitutional litigation.  But the 
adoption of our approach need not threaten a disruptive break with the past or a 
ruinous expansion of federal official liability.  On the view we take in this Essay, 
the Westfall Act provides, as section 1983 does in suits against state actors, 
statutory recognition of a right to pursue constitutional tort claims against federal 
actors.  The existence of an all-purpose right to sue federal officers would 
eliminate the threshold inquiry into the availability of a Bivens right of action.  
Constitutional litigation would focus instead on the sufficiency of the alleged 
constitutional violation, the clarity of constitutional rules, and the qualified 
immunity of government officials. Instead of the somewhat open-ended inquiry 
into “special factors” that may counsel hesitation, federal courts would conduct a 
more focused analysis to determine whether an alternative remedial scheme 
displaces the Bivens remedy, 
 
                                                                                                                                     
the legislation casts no doubt on the general availability of constitutional tort litigation.  The 
operative provision of the PLRA amends the FTCA to foreclose actions by federal prisoners “for 
mental or emotional injury” without a prior showing of physical injury.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2).  
The provision applies to suits against the United States and its agencies, as well as those against 
federal officers and employees.  A parallel provision curtails such litigation by state prisoners 
under section 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2006). 
89 As noted, a variety of common law theories of liability were available to the plaintiff.  See supra 
note 26.  For an account of the role of state courts in securing federal government accountability, 
subject either to removal or to review in the Supreme Court, see James E. Pfander, Article I 
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 
(2004). 




Such an approach would help clarify and simplify constitutional tort 
litigation without threatening federal officials with novel forms of personal 
liability or disrupting existing administrative law schemes.  As noted earlier, 
constitutional tort litigation against state actors under section 1983 now proceeds 
without any threshold inquiry into the existence of a right of action.  The Westfall 
Act suggests that Bivens claims against federal actors should be treated in 
precisely the same way.90  Such parallel treatment already prevails over a wide 
swath of constitutional tort law.  When the Court defines the elements of a legally 
sufficient constitutional claim, the definition applies to constitutional claims 
against both state and federal actors.91  Similarly, when the Court refines the rules 
of qualified immunity, it does so with the recognition that the same rules apply to 
officers at all levels of government.92
                                                 
90 Critics of the Bivens action also recognize the close connection between that form of 
constitutional tort litigation and suits under section 1983.  Justice Scalia has argued that Bivens 
was the product of improper judicial activism and should be limited to its facts.  See supra note 
  As the Court explained long ago, it would 
be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits 
brought against state officials . . . and suits brought directly under the Constitution 
6.  
He has taken much the same view of the Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), which authorized individuals to pursue constitutional tort claims against individual state 
officers and rejected the argument that the statute applied only to attacks on state policies.  See 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing section 
1983 as one “the [Monroe] Court created in 1961” rather than as one Congress enacted in 1871).  
In both instances, Justice Scalia focuses on the legislative framework in place at the time of the 
initial decision, and ignores subsequent legislation.  Yet just as the Westfall Act ratified the Bivens 
action, so too one can argue that Congress ratified Monroe in 1976 by adopting an attorney’s fee 
provision that sought to encourage section 1983 litigation.  See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, § 2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988) 
(authorizing, among other things, attorney’s fees for successful litigation under section 1983); see 
also S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (explaining that the amendment brings section 1983 litigation in 
line with modern civil rights statutes by providing attorney’s fees in suits against government 
officials).  
91 See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (specifying elements of malicious 
prosecution claim in the context of Bivens litigation and describing the Bivens action as the 
“federal analog to suits brought against state officials” under section 1983).  The Court in 
Hartman granted review to resolve a division among the circuits that involved both Bivens and 
1983 cases and it apparently expected its decision to apply in both settings.  See id. at 255 (citing 
division of circuit court authority and relying on Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), a 
1983 case).   Subsequent section 1983 suits treat the Hartman analysis as controlling.  See, e.g., 
Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 
609 (1999) (noting that in claims under section 1983 and Bivens, “qualified immunity analysis is 
identical”).  
92 See Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __ (Jan. 21, 2009) (treating Bivens and 1983 decisions as 
interchangeable on the subject of an official’s qualified immunity). 




against federal officials.”93  With the recognition that Congress has approved 
routine suability under the Westfall Act, distinctions between the right to sue state 
and federal officials seem equally untenable.94
We think the law of government accountability has much to gain from 
extending what the Court has already described as the “analog[ous]” relationship 
between the Bivens action and section 1983 claims.
 
 
95  For starters, we see real 
advantages in the development of a body of law that applies with presumptively 
equal force to both state and federal government officials.  Such presumptive 
equality provides individuals with some assurance that their rights will not vary 
depending on whether the allegedly unconstitutional conduct at issue was 
undertaken by state or federal government actors.96  In addition, a regime of 
presumptive equality will provide a framework for evaluating specific 
constitutional claims and defenses.  In particular, the law that frames and limits 
the viability of section 1983 claims can provide an appropriate basis for 
evaluating specific Bivens actions, just as Bivens developments can inform 
litigation against state actors.  While there may be situations in which differences 
in the two levels of government will warrant the development of disparate rules, a 
presumption of equality provides a starting point for analysis and a context in 
which to evaluate remedial choices.  The Court’s approach to the immunity of the 
President provides an illustration:  its previous decision to extend qualified 
immunity to state governors obliged the Court to explain why the President’s 
executive obligations required a more sweeping immunity.97
                                                 
93 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).  
94 Cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2605-06 (2007) (suggesting that protection of federal 
officers from excessive liability, a concern ordinarily vindicated through qualified immunity law, 
should also inform the question whether to recognize a Bivens action and thus opening a potential 
gap in the level of immunity protection afforded officers of state and federal governments).  
95 See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254 n.2. 
96 After all, in a world of cooperative federalism, state and federal law enforcement officials often 
work together on particular projects.  See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. 603 (recounting cooperation 
between state and federal law enforcement); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (noting 
that both federal and state officials bore responsibility for the administration of the social security 
disability program). 
97 Compare Fitzgerald v. Nixon, 457 U.S. 751 (1982) (emphasizing the “unique” responsibilities 
associated with the office of the president and distinguishing the qualified immunity of state 
governors and cabinet level officials), with Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor of 
Ohio entitled only to a qualified immunity from damages liability).  Interestingly, Fitzgerald 
recovered civil service remedies, including reinstatement and backpay, that were later said to 
crowd out a Bivens action. 
 
 




In any case, incorporation of the section 1983 framework can help to 
dampen any dislocating effects of our proposed approach to Bivens litigation.  
Our suggested elimination of a threshold inquiry into the availability of a right to 
sue may appear to threaten federal officers with liability the Court had previously 
rejected in its analysis of “special factors counseling hesitation.”  The reference to 
“special factors” first appeared in Bivens itself,98 and has since informed a variety 
of cases in which the Court has taken a narrow view of the availability of a Bivens 
remedy.  Thus, in cases such as Bush v. Lucas and Schweiker v. Chilicky, the 
Court has found that “special factors” argued against the recognition of a right to 
sue.99  By stripping away any inquiry into such factors as part of the evaluation of 
the existence of a right of action, our proposed interpretation of the Westfall Act 
may appear to threaten new federal liability.  Put in other terms, it may seem 
unlikely that Congress, in ratifying the Bivens action, would have made so 
dramatic an alteration in existing law without calling attention to the fact.100
We share this concern with continuity, but we note that the section 1983 
framework provides useful tools with which to evaluate the impact of some 
“special factors” on the viability of the Bivens/Westfall right of action.  Indeed, 
we think our new approach can accommodate the instincts, if not the analysis and 
result, of many cases in the Bivens line even as we abandon the threshold focus on 
the existence of a right of action.  Consider the Court’s approach in Bush v. Lucas.  
There, a federal employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
sought damages under Bivens after having been demoted for making remarks 
highly critical of the Alabama office where he worked.
 
 
101  The plaintiff also 
pursued remedies under federal civil service protections, and ultimately obtained 
an agency decision that overturned the demotion as a violation of his First 
Amendment rights and awarded him some $30,000 in back pay.102  Assuming that 
a constitutional violation had occurred, the Court faced the question of whether to 
recognize a Bivens action in addition to the civil service remedies the plaintiff had 
already secured.  Although the Court recognized that a Bivens suit could entitle 
the plaintiff to a wider range of relief, the Court viewed the civil service remedies 
as “constitutionally adequate.”103
                                                 
98 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971) (“The present case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.”). 
99 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
100 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
921 (1992). 
101 Bush, 462 U.S. at 369–70. 
102 Id. at 370–71. 
103 Id.. at 378 n.14.   
  As the Court saw matters, the existence of a 




comprehensive and elaborate remedial scheme ruled out the recognition of a 
Bivens remedy.  There were, as the Court noted, “special factors counseling 
hesitation.”104
A more refined version of this analysis would survive the recognition of a 
Westfall Act right of action, although it would come into play in a different 
doctrinal context.  Rather than informing the threshold decision about whether the 
courts should devise a right to sue, a focused and elaborate remedial scheme 
might operate to displace or impliedly preempt the Westfall Act’s more general 
remedy for constitutional violations.
 
 
105  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,106 provides a useful framework for 
evaluating the claim that a statutory scheme impliedly displaces constitutional tort 
claims under section 1983.  There, the plaintiffs sought damages under section 
1983 for a violation of equal protection, contending that their daughter had been 
subjected to peer-on-peer sexual harassment to which the school district 
responded inadequately.107
                                                 
104 Bush, 462 U.S. at 378–79 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)); see also id. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I join the 
Court's opinion because I agree that there are ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress.’”) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
The Bush Court’s conclusion that the remedies provided under the civil service laws were 
constitutionally adequate provides an appropriate factor in an inquiry into the possible implied 
displacement of the Westfall Act.  It would make little sense to authorize the substitution of 
constitutionally inadequate remedies.. 
105  One can see the implied displacement of general remedies at work in a variety of cases, most 
notably under section 1983.  There, the Court has sometimes treated a detailed federal statute as 
impliedly foreclosing the enforcement of rights against state actors through the use of an all-
purpose section 1983 remedy.  See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) 
(remedy under the federal Telecommunications Act supersedes remedy under section 1983).  
Compare Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) 
(complex administrative statute displaces section 1983 remedies), with Wright v. Roanoke Redev. 
& Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (no implied displacement).  Similarly, the Court has 
occasionally, though not uncontroversially, found that statutory remedies (even those invalidated 
in part on other grounds) may impliedly displace an Ex parte Young remedy.  See Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, though invalidated on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds, nonetheless displaces the availability of an enforcement action under Ex 
parte Young for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state’s governor).  For the critique, 
see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 40. 
106 129 S. Ct. 788  (2009). 
107 Id. at  792–93. 
  The school district argued that Title IX provided a 
remedial scheme for such harassment claims sufficiently detailed to displace 
section 1983 relief.  In rejecting this claim, the Court emphasized that Congress in 




enacting Title IX had expressed no legislative intent to displace 1983 claims and 
had not put in place detailed or more restrictive remedies that would suggest the 
inapplicability of constitutional tort litigation.108  Moreover, the Court pointed to 
differences in the substantive scope of coverage; while Title IX’s prohibition 
against gender discrimination applied only to the recipients of federal funds, and 
included numerous exceptions, the Equal Protection Clause made actionable 
through section 1983 applied more universally to all state actors.109  Finally, the 
Court noted that the remedies under section 1983 were available against 
individual officers, whereas those contemplated under Title IX reached only the 
responsible governmental entities.110
The decision in Fitzgerald—by a unanimous Court—suggests a relatively 
narrow view of the implied displacement of section 1983 claims, particularly 
when the alternative statute does not specifically purport to redress the alleged 
constitutional violation.  Application of the Fitzgerald framework to Bivens 
litigation might confirm the result in Bush v. Lucas but it would cast doubt on 
some of the Court’s more expansive applications of the “special factors” calculus.  
In Bush v. Lucas, the civil service scheme provided a remedy for the violation of a 
federal employee’s constitutional rights,
  In the end, the Court viewed the two 
remedial schemes as parallel rather than inconsistent. 
 
111 although recent scholarship casts 
doubt on the effectiveness of the remedy.112  The agency that reviewed Bush’s 
claim expressly found that the government had violated the employee’s First 
Amendment rights and awarded him relief in the form of reinstatement and back 
pay.113
                                                 
108 Id. at 795–97. 
109 Id. at 796. 
110 Id. 
111 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (describing “the comprehensive nature of the 
remedies currently available”). 
112 See Paul Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1101 (2008) (observing that the civil service scheme endorsed in Bush has not led to a single 
successful First Amendment claim by a federal employee since Bush, and arguing that the Bivens 
action should be revived); John Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy 38-39 (unpublished 
draft, on file with authors) (arguing that the CSRA remedies are insufficient to protect First 
Amendment rights due to procedural deficiencies, and advocating a Bivens remedy instead). 
  In other cases, however, the processes available did not purport to address 
113 Of course, the remedies in Bush v. Lucas appear inadequate in other respects, when measured 
against the standard of Fitzgerald.  The civil service scheme does not allow litigation against 
government officials, and provides remedies that do not correspond perfectly to those available 
under Bivens.  See Bush, 462 U.S. at 372 & nn. 8, 9 (highlighting the remedial differences).  But 
Bush came down in 1983, well before the passage of the Westfall Act created a statutory right of 
action.  As a result, the Court in Bush had no occasion to assume the availability of a statutory 




the constitutional issue and thus would seem to fail the Fitzgerald test.  Thus, in 
Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court identified state common law remedies, federal 
administrative process, and the opportunity to defend against a federal criminal 
proceeding as modes by which Robbins could secure redress against the pattern of 
retaliation.114  Importantly, however, none of these alternative remedies provided 
Robbins with an opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights.  The 
constitutional claim was not viable as a matter of state common law, whether 
brought against a state official or against the federal government under the FTCA, 
and the administrative scheme, as far as the record revealed, did not provide a 
forum for a claim of retaliation.115  With no other opportunity under a federal 
statute to secure an adjudication of his constitutional rights, there was no basis in 
Wilkie for finding that federal law impliedly displaced the Westfall Act 
remedy.116
Our approach also calls for some re-conceptualization of the cases in 
which the Court has denied a Bivens remedy on grounds that would also appear to 




117  There, the plaintiff sought to challenge the denial of 
social security benefits on procedural due process grounds under the Fifth 
Amendment.118
                                                                                                                                     
Bivens action or to evaluate the circumstances in which other federal statutory schemes might be 
said to have displaced the Westfall Act approach. 
114 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598–2600 (2007) (“In sum, Robbins has an 
administrative, and ultimately a judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints.”). 
115 The Wilkie Court merely discussed the availability of administrative and judicial review of 
adverse actions concerning Robbins’s permits.  Id. at 2599.  The fact that no redress for retaliation 
was available in such review likely informed the Court’s concession later in the opinion that even 
a patchwork of remedies might not suffice to make Robbins whole against the retaliation of the 
Bureau.  See id. at 2600-01 (“But Robbins's argument for a remedy that looks at the course of 
dealing as a whole, not simply as so many individual incidents, has the force of the metaphor 
Robbins invokes, ‘death by a thousand cuts.’ . . .  Agency appeals, lawsuits, and criminal defense 
take money, and endless battling depletes the spirit along with the purse. The whole here is greater 
than the sum of its parts.”). 
116 Use of the Fitzgerald framework would also call into question  
117 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
118 Id. at 418–19. 
  As in Bush v. Lucas, the litigants who challenged the practice at 
issue had obtained significant relief, including a fully retroactive award of the 
benefits that had been wrongfully withheld.  Plaintiffs sought an additional award 
of damages under Bivens.  The Schweiker Court refused to permit the Bivens 
action to proceed, citing Bush v. Lucas and arguing that the remedies available 




under the social security system counseled hesitation.119  Schweiker may appear to 
go beyond Bush in that it appears to recognize the possibility of a displacing 
federal remedy, even in circumstances where the remedy in question did not 
expressly address the constitutional claim.120  Yet in other respects, the remedial 
scheme in Schweiker includes features that could give rise to an implied 
displacement claim under Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee.  Not only 
did Congress impose an exhaustion requirement that funneled disability claims 
through the administrative process,121 but Congress also gave an indication that it 
meant to bar other modes of pursuing benefit claims against the government and 
its employees.122
Apart from the possibility of implied statutory displacement under Bush 




123  In Parratt, the plaintiff brought suit against officers of a state prison 
under section 1983, seeking damages on the basis of procedural due process for 
the loss of a hobby kit.124  Although the Court recognized in Parratt that a section 
1983 claim was available for any actionable constitutional violation, it sought to 
avoid the use of that statute as a vehicle with which prisoners could litigate 
modest property claims in the federal courts.  Instead of cutting back on the 
section 1983 action,125
                                                 
119 See id. at 425–28 (“The case before us cannot reasonably be distinguished from Bush v. Lucas. 
. . .  The remedy sought in Bush was virtually identical to the one sought by respondents in this 
case . . . .  Respondents' effort to separate the two does not distinguish this case from Bush in any 
analytically meaningful sense.”). 
120 See id. at 427–28 (dismissing the notion that the remedial scheme was inadequate because it 
failed to provide redress for “the constitutional violation itself” and reasoning that “the harm 
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation [cannot] be separated from the harm resulting 
from the denial of the statutory right”).  
121 See id. at 424-25 (citing the exhaustion rule). 
122 See 42 U.S.C. 405(h) (2006) (declaring that administrative scheme provides the exclusive mode 
of review and foreclosing suit against the federal government and its employees for claims under 
the statute).   See generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-66 (1975) (interpreting section 
405(h) to foreclose the assertion of jurisdiction over some constitutional claims arising from the 
denial of social security benefits); cf. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429 n.3 (refusing to resolve 
government’s claim that statutory exclusivity barred the assertion of jurisdiction over 
constitutional theories of liability). 
123 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
124 Id. at 529–30. 
125 In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that the existence of state tort remedies 
for the unlawful police conduct at issue did not foreclose the availability of a remedy under section 
1983.  
 the Court found that the existence of an adequate post-
deprivation remedy, available through the state tort system, was sufficient process 




to satisfy the constitutional requirement.126  The Court viewed state tort remedies 
as vitiating not the section 1983 right of action but the underlying constitutional 
claim.127  We think a similar approach might help to harmonize decisions in the 
Bivens line with our proposal to recognize a routinely available action under the 
Westfall Act.128  The plaintiff in Schweiker sought declaratory, mandamus, and 
injunctive relief to cure constitutional flaws in the social security system; the 
combined availability of such specific relief, coupled with the recovery of benefits 
due, could well provide the plaintiff with all the process constitutionally due 
under the Fifth Amendment.129
More recent decisions in the Parratt line suggest that Bivens relief may 
vary to some extent depending on the nature of the constitutional claim.  The 
Court has held that negligent conduct by government officials does not constitute 
a deprivation that brings the due process clause into play.
  
 
130  Moreover, the Court 
has distinguished between violations of the right to procedural due process and 
violations of substantive due process and the Bill of Rights.  Procedural due 
process violations have been said to occur when the government fails to provide 
appropriate curative process; courts considering such claims evaluate remedial 
alternatives.131  Violations of substantive constitutional rights, by contrast, are 
said to be complete when the wrongful action is taken.132
                                                 
126 See Parratt at 538–41. 
127 See id. at 543–44 (“Application of the principles recited above to this case leads us to conclude 
the respondent has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
128 In Parratt, the Court characterized the conduct of the prison guards as random and 
unauthorized and looked to state post-deprivation remedies.  See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.   The 
policies at issue in Schweiker were apparently the product of some deliberation on the part of the 
agency heads. Moreover, state tort remedies would have no relevance to the evaluation of remedial 
alternatives for claimants seeking to challenge the administration of social security benefits. 
129 Plaintiffs sought the certification of a class to press these claims for injunctive and declaratory 
relief, but dropped the claims after Congress revamped the administrative program that had 
allegedly led to their benefit termination.  See Chilicky v. Schweiker, 796 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 1986), rev’d, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).  After achieving a restoration of benefits, plus a lump sum 
to cover the period of wrongful denial, the plaintiffs had only their claim for damages under 
Bivens to pursue. 
130 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
131 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
132 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135-39 (1990) (distinguishing Parratt and Hudson). 
  Remedial options do 
not inform the evaluation of such substantive constitutional claims.  As a 
consequence, the scope of remedial displacement under the Parratt doctrine 
would be rather narrow.  While Parratt could bar the procedural due process 
claims, the doctrine would have no obvious effect on retaliation claims based on 




the First Amendment or other substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights.133  On 
this view, the FTCA could provide a relevant remedial option, but only for 
procedural due process claims.134
Our suggested incorporation of Parratt v. Taylor analysis into the Bivens 
context provides an alternative explanation for the Court’s decision in 
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.
  
 
135  In Malesko, the plaintiff brought suit 
for injuries he sustained as an inmate of a halfway house operated for the federal 
Bureau of Prisons by Correctional Services Corp. (CSC).136  In evaluating the 
existence of a Bivens action, the Court assumed that CSC, a private firm, was 
acting under color of federal law and thus subject to constitutional oversight.137  
But the Court nonetheless rejected the claim, emphasizing two considerations:  its 
previous decision to decline to extend a Bivens claim against a federal agency138 
and its perception that the plaintiff had alternative remedies available as a matter 
of state common law.139
                                                 
133 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
   In addition to these bases for its holding, the Court 
4, at 1106-10. 
134 From this vantage point, the Court’s rejection of the FTCA as a remedial option in the Eighth 
Amendment context, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980), does not seem inconsistent 
with its reliance on alternative remedies as a bar to procedural due process claims in Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 12 (1988).  Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 820-22 (questioning the 
doctrinal consistency of the Court’s approach). 
135 See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
136 Id. at 64-65. 
137 See id. at 70-71; see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (prison guards at 
private prison operating under state contract subject to liability under section 1983). 
138 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70-73 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) and assuming the 
existence of parallel tort remedies under state law for prisoners housed in privately run prisons). 
139 Id. at 72-73 (discussing “parallel tort remedies” available to inmates in private prisons).  The 
Court assumed that such remedies would be effective, an empirical proposition which it did not 
attempt to substantiate.  Examination of state law tort suits against private prisons finds some 
support for the Court’s view that such suits would be permitted to go forward, but the case law is 
sparse.  See, e.g., Stephens v. Correctional Servs. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
(allowing both section 1983 and state law claims against private prison because while prison was 
acting under color of state law, neither the Texas statutes nor the Texas Constitution extends 
private prisons sovereign immunity).  Defendants in such cases routinely invoke federal 
immunities, which have not proven effective to this point.  See, e.g., id. at 583 (rejecting state 
sovereign immunity defense); Adorno v. Correctional Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 3d 505, 521-22 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting government contractor’s defense).  Such defenses could certainly prove 
effective in other litigation. 
To the extent that federal law presents hurdles to successful state court litigation, we 
believe the Court’s approach in Malesko requires that it take some responsibility for ensuring the 
adequacy of state common law remedies.  So far, we see no cause for undue alarm.  Some private 
prisons have attempted to interpose their status as federal contractors as a defense to liability they 
would otherwise face at common law and as a justification for removal of state law actions to 




described the origins and later evolution of the Bivens remedy in terms that a 
leading casebook characterized as “exceptionally grudging.”140  We share this 
view of the Malesko dicta and point out that the case, coming after the adoption of 
the Westfall Act in 1988, provided the Court with a missed opportunity to re-
evaluate the legitimacy of the Bivens action in light of congressional 
ratification.141
Despite our disagreement with the Malesko dicta, we believe the dismissal 
of the action may make sense under Parratt.  In Malesko, the plaintiff alleged that 
his injuries were the result of the negligence of CSC employees; CSC was said to 
have been negligent in failing to provide him with medication and negligent in 
refusing to permit him to use the elevator.
 
 
142  While the federal district court 
characterized Malesko’s claims as arising under the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the Eighth Amendment,143 it’s not immediately obvious that negligent 
conduct alone can give rise to such a claim.144
                                                                                                                                     
federal court.  The Court anticipated the first possibility, describing the government contractor 
defense as applicable only where the government commanded the “very thing” at issue in the 
litigation.  See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 n.6 (citing Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 
500 (1988)); cf. Adorno, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 521-22 (rejecting government contractor’s defense on 
the strength of the Malesko Court’s dictum).  The Court has also narrowed federal officer removal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, excluding private firms acting within what they claimed was the scope of 
federal permission.  See Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142 (2007). 
  In the context of section 1983 
litigation, moreover, the Court had previously ruled that the merely negligent 
140 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 820. 
141 As in Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court in Malesko failed to discuss the implications of the Westfall 
Act for the recognition of a Bivens right of action.  The Court also ignored the Westfall Act in 
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).  In Meyer, the Court found that section 1346(b) of the 
FTCA failed to authorize constitutional tort actions against the government.  See Meyer, 510 U.S. 
at 478-79.  Although the Court found the FDIC generally amenable to suit under a sue-and-be-
sued clause in its organic law, the Court refused to expand the Bivens doctrine to allow 
constitutional tort claims against suable federal agencies.  See id. at 484-86.  Notably, the Westfall 
Act allows a civil action for constitutional violations to proceed against federal officers and 
employees but says nothing to authorize such suits against federal agencies.  The Act thus 
supports the FDIC v. Meyer result. 
142 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting amended complaint). 
143 See id. at 73 (“The District Court, however, construed the complaint as raising a Bivens claim, 
presumably under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”); cf. 
Preis, supra note 112, at 42 (purporting that Malesko asserted a deliberate indifference claim 
under the Eighth Amendment in the District Court). 
144 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73 (noting the negligence allegation and contrasting it with the 
requirement that claims for cruel and unusual punishment ordinarily must meet at least a 
“deliberate indifference” threshold) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) and 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) for deliberate indifference standard under Eighth 
Amendment). 




conduct of prison officials, causing personal injury to a state prisoner, does not 
constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause.145
Whatever its implications for Malesko, the Parratt decision offers scant 
support for the Court’s grudging approach in Wilkie v. Robbins.  There, the 
plaintiff sought relief for claims of intentional and malicious retaliation under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Court failed to identify any robust 
body of state common law as a source of alternative remedies; indeed, as we have 
seen, the FTCA forecloses common law claims against federal officials.
  If one were to characterize Malesko’s claim 
as one for deprivation of liberty under the due process component of the Fifth 
Amendment, the complaint’s failure to allege more than mere negligence could 
support a denial of relief. 
 
146  Nor 
could the plaintiff seek vindication of his constitutional claim before the US Court 
of Federal Claims.  While post-deprivation relief through the Tucker Act may 
substitute for the right of plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief against certain 
federal projects,147 the Tucker Act provides no remedy for constitutional tort 
claims.148  One thus has difficulty identifying a body of remedial law that could 
operate to foreclose Robbins’ claim; remedial displacement under Fitzgerald and 
Bush v. Lucas makes no sense where Robbins lacks an alternative forum for his 
constitutional claim.  Moreover, the intentional character of the alleged violations 
seemingly forecloses the conclusion that Robbins suffered no deprivation within 
the meaning of cases in the Parratt line.  Although the Wilkie Court did not treat 
the existence of alternative remedies as decisive,149
                                                 
145 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
146 See supra Part III. 
147 See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (owner may not challenge federal statute that threatens 
a taking of land where owner may bring a taking claim for compensation before the Court of 
Federal Claims under the Tucker Act); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 
682 (1949) (denying injunctive relief against federal government where owner of wrongly 
withheld property could assert a breach of contract claims for money damages under the Tucker 
Act). 
148 The Tucker Act itself limits its damage remedy to cases “not sounding in tort.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1491(a)(1) (2006).  Cf. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Tucker 
Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against 
individual federal officers.  Thus, the Bivens actions asserted by appellants lie outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”) (citation omitted).   
 the Court’s reliance on such 
149 The extent of the Court’s reliance on alternatives in Wilkie remains unclear.  While the Court 
cited the availability of remedial options in the first stage of its analysis, it concluded that these 
options were not decisive and conducted a stage-two analysis of factors counseling hesitation.  See 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007) (“This state of the law gives Robbins no 
intuitively meritorious case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, but neither does it 









Although the statutory schemes differ for state and federal official action, 
the Court has in many cases self-consciously attempted to develop rules for 
section 1983 claims that parallel those applicable to Bivens litigation.  In keeping 
with this practice of conscious parallelism, the Court has made clear that its 
rulings on such matters as the allocation of the burdens of pleading and proof,150 
the definition of the elements of a claim of constitutional violation, 151 and the 
refinement of the law of qualified immunity apply with equal force in both 
settings.152  No one doubts, for example, that the Court’s qualified immunity 
decision in Pearson v. Callahan will govern the analysis of claims brought 
against both state and federal officials.153
We do not believe that the Court can any longer fairly attribute this state 
of affairs to congressional inaction.  As we have seen, the Westfall Act of 1988 
 
 
In a departure from this practice of parallel development, the Court takes a 
narrow view of the availability of the Bivens right of action.  In suits against state 
actors, the Court views section 1983 as providing an express right of action for 
constitutional tort claims.  As a consequence, the Court presumes the availability 
of such actions as it fills out remedial details.  But in the Bivens context, as we 
have seen, the Court views itself as devising a right to sue on a case-by-case basis.  
In its most recent effort in this vein, the Court conducted an evaluation, likely 
mistaken, of the availability of state common law remedies and reached a 
judgment, certainly contestable, about the wisdom of opening the door to a new 
category of constitutional tort litigation.  Such judicial selectivity invites criticism 
from those who view the task of recognizing rights to sue as inherently legislative.  
Judicial selectivity also suggests that the individual citizen’s constitutional rights 
may differ, as a practical matter, depending on whether the violation occurs at the 
hands of a state or federal officer. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it. . . . This, then, is a case for Bivens 
step two, for weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way 
common law judges have always done.”) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
150 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
151 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 
152 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
153 See Pearson v. Callahan (overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). 




contains express language confirming the availability of civil actions against 
federal officials for violations of the Constitution.  Taking account of this 
statutory development, the Court should abandon its case-by-case approach in 
favor of the routine recognition of the viability of the Bivens claim.  Such a 
change in its approach would answer longstanding questions of legitimacy and 
would do so without occasioning any wrenching departure from the existing 
remedial framework.  The Court could continue to honor conflicting 
congressional signals by borrowing section 1983’s analysis to evaluate when 
another federal administrative scheme impliedly displaces the Bivens remedy.  
The resulting framework would better reflect Congress’s desire to preserve the 
Bivens action and would enable the Court to ensure that constitutional rights apply 
with equal force to the interactions between individuals and officials at all levels 
of our federal government. 
 
